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1. Introduction1
Electricity systems are unusual because of the fact that electricity cannot be stored. 
This means that supply must exactly equal demand second by second throughout the 
day. Generation capacity takes time to build and is very expensive and demand is 
quite insensitive to price signals. The result is a system where either there is sufficient 
spare generation capacity to meet all possible levels of demand or else, periodically, 
the lights will go off for some consumers.  
For other services, such as retailing or transport, temporary shortages may not have 
serious economic and social consequences, but in the case of electricity the effects 
may be very serious, for example affecting emergency health services. While there is 
a high cost for consumers when electricity supply is uncertain, generally they cannot 
or do not reflect this cost in price signals. If there were a market mechanism, where 
consumers could pay an insurance premium to ensure emergency supply, the market 
could be allowed to determine the optimal level of capacity. However, such a market 
generally does not exist.2  
Thus policy makers in the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) and in the 
Department of Communications Marine and Natural Resources (DCMNR) in the 
Republic, and in the Northern Ireland Authority for Energy Regulation (NIAER) and 
the Department of Enterprise Trade and Industry (DETI) in the North, must take the 
possibility of such unexpected failures very seriously and protect the economy and 
society generally from the serious consequences of such failures. This involves 
ensuring that the electricity generation capacity available throughout the year is 
always sufficient to cover not only expected demand, but also enough to cover 
unexpected failures in generators or unexpected surges in demand, guaranteeing a 
reliable electricity supply to all consumers. Because spare capacity is very expensive 
to provide, it is important that the level of unused capacity is no more than is needed 
to ensure a specified level of reliability. Otherwise consumers could find themselves 
paying an unnecessarily high price for electricity, effectively buying a more expensive 
“insurance policy” than they really need.  
All electricity systems face uncertainty as to their capacity to continuously meet 
fluctuating levels of demand. This uncertainty can arise from a number of different 
factors. For example, the growth in demand may over time outpace supply. Also, even 
if existing capacity may be adequate to meet expected demand, unexpected failures by 
individual generating units could leave supply suddenly lower than demand, giving 
rise to blackouts.  
The issue of the adequacy of generation capacity to meet expected future demand 
levels, where both future supply and future demand are treated as being “certain”, is 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank the staff of Eirgrid and Northern Ireland Electricity for their advice 
and helpful criticism in preparing this paper. The author alone is responsible for the analysis and 
conclusions presented here. 
2 An exception is the case where consumers install emergency generators. However, such generators 
are themselves not fully reliable and for many consumers installation of such capacity is not a feasible 
option. 
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considered elsewhere (Eirgrid, 2004b and Bergin, et al., 2003). Instead this paper 
concentrates on how unexpected breakdowns in individual generation units can affect 
the reliability of supply and on how much additional capacity is needed to cover for 
such unexpected equipment failures. This paper assesses how much generation 
capacity is needed to provide a specified level of reliability in an uncertain world. 
Specifically, it considers how different levels of interconnection between the two 
electricity systems on this island would affect the reliability of the supply north and 
south of the border. 
Using a special model, this paper looks at the extent of the generation capacity which 
would have been needed in 20033 to meet a given reliability standard for the Republic 
of Ireland electricity system treated in isolation, for the Northern Ireland system 
treated in isolation, and how the picture would be changed if there were a fully 
integrated all-island system. It also looks at how additional or reduced capacity would 
have affected the probability of a loss of load (where demand exceeds supply and 
some consumers suffer blackouts), giving an indication of how the system might 
perform in later years. This paper does not attempt to breakdown the benefits of 
different levels of interconnection for the consumers in the two electricity systems. 
The difference between the cost of meeting a given adequacy standard on the basis of 
the two systems remaining isolated and the cost for an integrated island-wide system 
is a measure of one of the potential benefits of moving towards an all-island 
electricity system. Such a benefit, from savings in reserve or “spare” capacity, would 
be additional to any benefits that might arise from trading in an all-island market, 
achieving a more efficient dispatch of existing generation stations. Further possible 
gains could also be expected from the enhanced level of competition possible in a 
larger market. These additional potential benefits are not considered in this paper. 
The creation of a fully integrated all-island system, where reserves of generation 
capacity could be shared independently of where they were located, would require 
significant additional investment in transmission capacity. The costs of such 
investment would have to be offset against the potential benefits, discussed below, to 
arrive at an informed costs-benefit analysis of creating an all-island electricity system. 
Today there is already one interconnector linking the two systems North and South. 
However, this interconnector has strictly limited capacity, partly due to congestion in 
the system south of the border. Even with no such congestion, reliance on a single 
interconnector to provide security would be unsafe for both parts of the island because 
all transmission lines are subject to possible failure, for example through the effects of 
strikes by lightning. However, even in its present limited form, the North-South 
interconnector has significant value in enhancing the security of the two systems, 
North and South of the border. This paper models the benefits of a fully integrated 
system compared to the current system with limited interconnection, and also 
compared to a system with no interconnector. 
                                                 
3 This exercise could be repeated for forecast demand and supply levels for later years. The results of 
using forecast data for later years could affect the magnitude and the distribution of benefits from 
integration. As indicated later, the electricity systems in both jurisdictions are continually developing. 
To reflect this two slightly different configurations are tried for Northern Ireland generation capacity. 
The results for 2003 are intended for illustrative purposes only. 
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The data used in the model are summarised in Section 2. Section 3 describes the 
model and Section 4 describes the results obtained concerning the generation capacity 
needed to meet specified levels of security of supply. Section 5 provides conclusions. 
Further technical details are given in appendices 
2. Data 
The model uses historical data for hourly demand for each of the 365 days of 2003 for 
the Republic of Ireland and for Northern Ireland. It is run for each hour of the year to 
check on the probability that generators might be unexpectedly out of action and that, 
as a result, demand would have exceeded supply in that hour, resulting in unmet 
demand. 
Each generation unit, North and South, is separately identified in the model (as 
opposed to aggregating the generation units by station). This allows for the fact that, 
while one generation unit in a station, like Moneypoint, could suffer unexpected 
failure, the other units in the plant could often still run independently. The generation 
capacity of each of the stations is identified in the model, and the model determines 
the aggregate capacity likely to be available on each system (North and South) for 
each hour of the year.  
The generation capacity assumed to be available from each unit is specified in 
Appendix 3. This configuration roughly approximates the situation in 2003. However, 
with the system changing all of the time it can not be considered an exact 
representation of the generation capacity on the island on any individual day. As 
described in Section 4 we tested the sensitivity of the results to a small change in the 
configuration where there was an additional generation unit in Northern and where, as 
a result, the North had an additional 243 MW of capacity available. 
For each generation unit an assumption is made about the expected availability over 
the year. This is specified in terms of the percentage of the year for which the unit will 
be available. The time when it is not available is required to undertake scheduled 
maintenance. The maintenance on each unit is assumed to take place over a 
continuous period and is specified in terms of the days when the plant is out of 
operation. (The number of days when the generator is specified as off for maintenance 
is chosen to give the planned percentage annual availability specified in Appendix 3). 
The maintenance schedules for all plant are designed to leave a fairly similar margin 
between peak capacity and planned availability over the course of the year. This 
means that the bulk of the maintenance is scheduled between late March and October. 
 While a “sensible” maintenance schedule has been specified, it would, of course, be 
possible to search for the “optimal” schedule simultaneously with the modelling of 
unexpected outages, where “optimal” was defined as that schedule which would 
minimise the likelihood of a shortage of power. However, adding such a dimension to 
the model would greatly complicate the solution process and it is not considered 
further here in this note. 
In the case of the hydro stations, it is assumed that they are available throughout the 
year to cover peak demand. The number of hours for which they are assumed to be 
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available is calculated to give roughly the average availability for the year that has 
been observed in the past4. The hours when each plant is generating are pre-specified 
in the model and no allowance is made for maintenance. As with all other stations the 
hydro stations are subject to the possibility of unexpected failure. 
For the wind generators (210 MW in the Republic, 20 MW in the North) and the other 
renewables a simplifying assumption is made that they are unavailable on a random 
basis throughout the year, with the probability of their being unavailable being an 
input into the model. For example, ex post electricity from the wind generators is 
assumed to be available on 37% of the days of the year. It is assumed that all wind 
generators are together either fully available or totally unavailable on individual days. 
This is obviously an extreme assumption, but any more sophisticated treatment would 
have little appreciable effect on the results. 
In addition to the proportion of the year for which each generation unit is expected to 
be unavailable due to planned maintenance, each unit is assigned a probability of 
forced or unexpected outage. These probabilities are shown in Appendix 3. These 
probabilities are assumed to be independent, and no account is taken of the possibility 
of other parts of the system failing, in particular no account is taken of potential 
transmission problems, other than potential problems with the North-South 
interconnector(s) and the Moyle interconnector to Scotland.5 This assumption of 
“independence” of failure probabilities may not be fully realistic as there could, for 
example, be a fault in the connection to the grid at Moneypoint, which could put all 
three generation sets offline simultaneously. Other possible non-grid causes of failure 
of more than one generating set on a single site could include local fuel supply 
difficulties, problems with cooling water etc.. However, this assumption of 
independence provides a reasonable basis for simplifying the analysis. 
The forced outages are all assumed to begin at midnight and to last for a full day (with 
the exception of the hydro stations, which are in any event assumed to run for only 
part of the day). Once again this simplification is used to make the model more 
tractable. As discussed in Appendix 1, identical results could be expected if the forced 
outage were assumed to occur at random on an hourly basis throughout the year. 
The average expected availability for a plant over the year is then defined as: 
 (1-P1) (1-P2) 
where P1 is the percentage of the year that a station will be unavailable because of 
planned maintenance and where P2 is the probability of unexpected failure. 
3. The Model 
This paper describes the model that has been developed of the electricity system that 
takes account of the fact that all generation stations are subject to a non-zero 
probability of unexpected breakdown, as is the link(s) between the systems in the 
                                                 
4 Because of the use of hourly data rather than data by the minute, there is some small “rounding” error. 
5 For each interconnector a probability of forced outage over the course of the year of 1% is assumed. 
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Republic and in Northern Ireland. It models how the probability of unexpected failure 
in one or more generation units could result in overall capacity falling short of 
demand, leading to forced reductions in supply to some customers. The model also 
takes account of planned maintenance. The model makes the simplifying assumption 
that the maintenance schedule is planned well in advance and that it cannot be varied 
in the event of unexpected breakdowns. 
The model takes each generation set each day and first checks whether it is down for 
planned maintenance (see Appendix 2 for the annotated code for the model).6 Then, 
using a random number generator, the model checks to see whether the station is 
available on all other days in the year (when not undergoing planned maintenance) or 
whether it is subject to an unexpected outage. The probability of an unexpected 
outage is specified separately for each plant. Over the course of a large number of 
simulations the model will produce an average availability of each plant (excluding 
planned maintenance) as defined above. However, there may be significant deviations 
from this average from day to day and from simulation to simulation. These 
deviations reflect the uncertainty defined by the probabilities of unexpected outage. 
The model sums the availability of generation capacity in MW for the Republic, for 
the North, and for the island as a whole for each hour in each day in each simulation. 
There is a small variation within the day in the availability because of the 
predetermined timing of the generation from the hydro plant.7 For each day of 2003 
the model compares the availability by hour for each system (North, South, and the 
island as a whole) to the hourly demand for that day and determines how many hours, 
if any, demand would have exceeded supply. It also estimates the number of GWh 
(gigawatt hours) that would be lost as a result of forced outages, causing supply to be 
inadequate. The number of hours of shortage (loss of load) and the total amount of 
unmet demand (in GWh) is calculated for the year as a whole. 
Table 1: Options on North-South Interconnection 
Option Transfer Capacity Forced Outage of Interconnector 
 North-South South-North  
1 0 0 Not relevant 
2 300 100 Possible 
3 300 300 Possible 
4 600 100 Possible 
5 600 400 Possible 
6 Infinite Infinite Not possible 
This process is subject to a monte carlo simulation, with the model being run 1,000 
times for the same year with different random draws of plant availability for each 
period in each simulation. The average annual number of hours of loss of load across 
all the 1,000 simulations is then assumed to represent the probability of loss of load.8 
                                                 
6 The planned maintenance is implemented in the model through a matrix with unity for each day when 
a station is available and zero for when it is undergoing planned maintenance. This matrix is the 
YrCons sheet in the spreadsheet Modelin.XLS, available from the author. 
7 See the DayConsH sheet in the Modelin.XLS spreadsheet. 
8 There is very little difference when the model is run for only 1,000 rather than 10,000 iterations. 
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A commonly used measure of reliability is the Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), the 
expected number of hours in the year in which demand would exceed supply. The 
standard currently applied in the Republic is a LOLE of 8 hours in the year. 
The model checks a number of variants (Table 1) on the extent of the interconnection 
of the two electricity systems on the island, from one extreme where there is assumed 
to be no connection between the two systems North and South to the other extreme 
where the island system is fully integrated with no possibility of a failure of 
interconnection. The model also allows for differing maximum transfer capacities 
from North to South and from South to North. In each case the capacities are used for 
illustrative purposes. They do not represent the exact engineering possibilities of the 
current system and the characterisation of future systems is, of necessity, stylised. 
Finally, the model also allows for differing assumptions on the extent to which the 
interconnector(s) is (are) subject to possible unexpected failure. 
Option 1 considers the case where the two systems are completely independent, as 
they were from the early 1970s until the restoration of the interconnector in the late 
1990s.9 The second option considers a stylised version of the current situation where 
there is a limited transfer capability from the North to the South of 300MW and from 
the South to the North of only 100MW.10 (The difference in transfer capabilities arises 
because of excess generation capacity in Dublin combined with transmission 
constraints in the Louth area.) According to Eirgrid, 2004c, “both internal 
reinforcement and a new 275kV interconnector would be required to increase 
interconnector transfer capability beyond existing limits.”11 Eirgrid, 2004c, also states 
that “studies show that exports to Northern Ireland are also limited by a lack of 
transmission capacity between Dublin and Drogheda” – the Louth area. The third 
stylised scenario is characterised as a relaxation in transmission constraints in the 
Republic sufficient to allow a symmetric transfer capability of 300MW. The fourth 
option looks at the case where a new interconnector is built, without addressing the 
transmission constraints in the Louth area, increasing the North-South capacity with 
no change in the South-North capacity. The fifth option is the same as option 4, with 
the exception that it also includes the strengthening of the grid in the Louth area, 
allowing much greater exports from the South to the North.12 The final option 
considers the case where there is unlimited certain transfer capability in both 
directions.  
It should be noted that a loss of load expectation (LOLE) of 8 hours or around 0.09% 
of the year (the threshold used here) for the island as a whole is a tighter standard than 
a similar LOLE for either of the jurisdictions taken on their own. This is because a 
                                                 
9 The interconnector was put out of action by terrorist action in the early 1970s and was only restored 
after the Good Friday agreement. 
10 Detailed engineering studies would be required before precise quantification of the transfer 
capacities of the different options could be made available.  
11 There may also be a need for some strengthening of the grid within Northern Ireland to allow a major 
increase in trade in electricity. 
12 An additional option was tried where the interconnectors were treated as certain – not subject to 
forced outage. However, this made almost no difference to the results where two interconnectors were 
involved.  
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given LOLE for the island will result in a smaller percentage of customers suffering a 
loss of load than would be the case for either of the two systems taken on their own. 
As described later, this is reflected in the estimated unmet demand under the different 
scenarios. 
In order to test the sensitivity of the results and to help in estimating the additional 
generation needed to meet the specified LOLE standard, the model also simulates the 
likely LOLE with additional or reduced generation capacity (or demand) compared to 
the baseline simulation of the capacity available in 2003. The model simulates the 
effects of up to 700MW more capacity and up to 800 MW less capacity than in 2003 
in increments (decrements) of 50MW. It is possible to interpolate the results for 
intervening configurations. In each case these changes in capacity (demand) are 
treated as certain – a zero probability of planned or unplanned outage for the change 
in capacity.13  
4. Results 
Availability 
When the model was simulated with both the planned availability assumptions and the 
forced outage probabilities shown in Appendix 3, it produced an average availability 
for the Republic of Ireland of 75.1% and an average availability for Northern Ireland 
of 89.7%. The average for the island electricity system was 79.0%. These average 
availability figures take account of the expected low availability of hydro and wind in 
the Republic, together with the low availability of the small amount of wind currently 
installed in the North. 
Figure 1: Republic of Ireland Generation Requirements with Higher Forced Outage 
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On the basis of the existing interconnector, the model was run for the electricity 
system in the Republic, assuming that the average availability of generating stations 
in the Republic was reduced by around 0.8 percentage points (from 75.1% to 74.3%). 
                                                 
13 An alternative way of viewing the results where capacity is assumed to vary is to consider the 
variation as a change in (certain) demand of the same amount, but opposite sign. 
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This was implemented by assuming a higher level of forced outage across all stations 
in the Republic. The model results showed the risk of forced outage at different 
capacity levels. 
As shown in Figure 1, on the basis of  the existing interconnector, the security 
standard of a Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) of 8 hours could still have been met 
with a saving in capacity of around 100 MW compared to the actual capacity in 2003 
(see also Table 2). However, with a reduction in average availability of around 0.8 
percentage points, to hold the LOLE at the 8 hour standard would have only permitted 
a saving in generation capacity of around 25 MW – a reduction in savings of 75MW 
at a capital cost of around €50 million compared to the base14. Eirgrid, 2004b, has a 
very similar estimate of the cost of high levels of unexpected outage – 100 MW for a 
1 percentage point reduction in average availability.15 This illustrates the high cost 
resulting from the current low levels of availability in the Republic. 
Interconnection Options 
The results of simulating the model with different assumptions on interconnection 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic are shown in Table 2 for the Republic of 
Ireland. The Table shows the probability of a forced outage occurring in the Republic 
over the course of last year. Appendix 5 gives details of the related unmet demand 
that such outages would have given rise to. The numbers in bold are for the cases 
where the Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) exceeds the equivalent of 8 hours (a 
probability of 0.09%), the current de facto standard for security of supply in the 
Republic.  
Table 2: Republic of Ireland, Probability of Loss of Load, 2003, % 
Bold worse than 0.09% 
  Interconnection Capacity to RoI 
Simulation Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Possible unexpected breakdown   Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Certain 
 MW 0 300 300 600 600 Unlimited 
 300 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
more generation / less load 200 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 100 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        
With Current Generation Capacity  0.35 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
        
 -100 0.70 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 -200 1.32 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Less generation / more load -300 2.35 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.45 
 -400 3.98 1.47 1.47 1.40 1.40 1.40 
 -500 6.39 3.67 3.67 3.63 3.62 3.63 
In simulation 1, with the available capacity in 2003, if there had been no 
interconnection between the North and the South there would have been a probability 
of loss of load of 0.35%, equivalent to a LOLE of 31 hours for the year, very much 
greater than the 8 hours standard (equivalent to a probability of 0.09%). The Table 
                                                 
14 As explained later, the cost of generation capacity is taken from CER, 2004. 
15 Transmission System Operator, 2003, Generation Adequacy Report 2004-2010, p.78. 
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shows that approximately an additional 200MW of capacity would have been needed 
in the Republic in 2003 to ensure system adequacy in the absence of an interconnector 
to Northern Ireland, restoring the probability of loss of load to less than 0.09%.16
Simulation 2 approximates the current level of interconnection between the North and 
the South. As shown in simulation 2, given the possibility of transfer of 300MW 
through the existing interconnector from the North whenever the Northern system was 
in surplus in 2003, the probability of a loss of load was reduced to 0.04%, well within 
the threshold of a LOLE of 8 hours.17 In fact the LOLE standard (probability of loss 
of load of 0.09%) could have been met with 100MW less capacity than was actually 
in place in 2003. Thus, at the benchmark standard of a LOLE of 8 hours, the 
interconnector could have saved the Republic 300MW of installed capacity compared 
to the case if the two electricity systems were completely independent.  
For the Republic simulation 3 is identical to simulation 2, only involving different 
transfer capacities from south to north. In simulation 4, it is assumed that there are 
two interconnectors, allowing a gross transfer from North to South of 600MW. As can 
be seen from the Table 2, the probability of a forced outage is marginally reduced in 
this simulation compared to the current level of interconnection. As shown later in 
Table 4, in this simulation the Republic could have saved approximately a further 
75MW of capacity compared to the situation with the current level of interconnection. 
The doubling of the interconnector would be worth much less to the Republic than is 
the availability of the existing interconnector. This illustrates the diminishing 
marginal returns to investment in transmission. 
Table 3: Northern Ireland, Probability of Loss of Load, 2003, % 
Bold worse than 0.09% 
  Interconnection Capacity to North 
Simulation Number  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Possible unexpected breakdown   Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Certain 
 MW 0 100 300 100 400 Unlimited 
 300 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
More generation / less load 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 100 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        
With Current Generation Capacity  0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
        
 -100 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 
less generation / more load -200 0.40 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.03 
 -300 0.89 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.12 0.11 
 
Simulation 5 is identical to simulation 4 for the Republic. A further simulation (not 
shown) was carried out assuming that there was no possibility of unplanned failures 
                                                 
16 Using interpolated data, a more precise quantification is shown later in Table 4. 
17 This allows for the possibility of a forced outage of the interconnector with a probability of 1%, as 
specified in Appendix 3. 
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on the two interconnectors. This produced identical results to simulations 4 and 5, 
where there is a 1% probability of forced outage for each of the two interconnectors.   
The sixth simulation assumed an infinite potential to transfer power from North to 
South. This simulation produced identical results to the case of simulations 4 and 5 
(where the two interconnectors have a combined capacity of 600MW and still have 
some independent probability of forced outage for each interconnector). This suggests 
that there would be no additional security benefits for the Republic from further 
investment, over and above that needed to install a second interconnector. 
The results of simulating the model for Northern Ireland are shown in Table 3. In 
simulation 1, with the available generation capacity in Northern Ireland in 2003, if 
there had been no interconnection between the North and the South, there would have 
been a probability of loss of load of 0.05%, less than the 0.09% corresponding to the 8 
hours LOLE threshold. The LOLE standard could have been met with 50MW less of 
capacity. In simulation 2, with the existing limited interconnection capacity of 
100MW from South to North, the probability of forced outage would have been even 
lower at 0.02%. 
With a strengthening of the transmission in the Louth areas of the Republic to allow a 
transfer capacity from South to North of 300MW the probability of forced outage in 
the North would have fallen even further, as shown in simulation 3. As shown in 
Table 3, this would have allowed a further saving in capacity in the North of around 
100MW compared to the current level of interconnection. 
For the North simulation 4 is the same as simulation 2. For simulation 5 the transfer 
capacity from South to North would be enhanced by a further 100MW (to 400MW) 
compared to simulation 3. In this case the probability of a loss of load would be even 
lower, allowing a further small saving in capacity. As shown in Simulation 6, moving 
to an infinite transfer capacity would produce an imperceptible reduction in the risk of 
forced outage for consumers in Northern Ireland. 
Figure 2: All-Island System: Probability of Outage by Generation Capacity 
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Examination of the detailed results for lower capacity and higher probabilities of 
forced outage (not shown here) indicates that the likelihood of forced outage increases 
more rapidly for Northern Ireland than for the Republic, the greater the shortage of 
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capacity. For example, if the study was repeated but with 250 to 300 MW less 
generation located in Northern Ireland, the increase in the probability of loss of load 
for Northern Ireland would be greater than would be the case under similar 
circumstances in the Republic. This reflects the fact that unit sizes are larger relative 
to the overall size of the system in Northern Ireland, so that a forced outage of a 
similar magnitude, in terms of MW of capacity, can have a bigger percentage effect 
on availability in the North than in the Republic. However, moving from the 
Republic’s system to an all island system would not have much effect as the number 
of units and their average size relative to the system in the Republic is already quite 
small. 
Figure 2 shows the probability of a loss of load plotted against different levels of 
installed generation capacity.18 These results are for an all island system with infinite 
transfer capacity. This shows that the LOLE of 8 hours (a probability of around 
0.09%) could have been achieved with a saving in generation capacity of around 350 
MW. 
Table 4 summarises the results for the different options on interconnection shown in 
Tables 2 and 3. For each option, based on assumed demand and generation capacity in 
place in 2003, it shows the probability of forced outage and the related Loss of Load 
Expectation. It also shows the number of GWh of unmet demand that could be 
expected to arise as a result of this level of forced outage. The figures are shown 
separately for the North and the Republic. At the current level of interconnection, as 
characterised in this paper, both systems would have met the LOLE standard of 8 
hours. 
The second half of Table 4 shows the savings in generation capacity that could be 
made under the different interconnection scenarios, while still preserving a LOLE of 8 
hours. It also shows the value of these savings on the basis of the CER’s costings for 
the capital cost of a “Best New Entrant” Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
station in 2005 (CER, 2004). The CER paper puts the capital cost at €0.66 million per 
MW of installed generation capacity. 
In the second half of Table 4 the savings are expressed as a change compared to the 
current level of interconnection. Thus if there were no interconnection between the 
Republic and the North an additional 290 MW of plant would have been required in 
the Republic (compared to the optimal stock under the current situation) to ensure the 
same security standard as was possible in 2003. To provide such additional plant 
would have cost around €191 million. For the North the absence of the current 
interconnector would have required an additional 90 MW of generation capacity 
(compared to the optimal stock under the current situation) at a capital cost of around 
€59 million. 
                                                 
18 Here the reduction in capacity is assumed to be a certain (not subject to unexpected breakdown) 
reduction of the specified amount in the generation capacity available. Alternatively it could represent 
an increase in demand of the same amount. 
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Table 4: Summary Results for Different Interconnector Options 
 Probability of Loss of Load and Related Unmet Demand 
Interconnection Options   None Existing  Existing  Additional  Additional  Infinite  
Internal constraints addressed  None None In Republic In North All All 
Transfer Capacity:19               
Power to Northern Ireland MW 0 100 300 100 400 Infinite 
Power to Republic of Ireland MW 0 300 300 600 600 Infinite 
Hours 4.3      1.5 0.2 1.5 0.1 0.1
% outage 0.05      0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00Northern Ireland LOLE 
GWh 0.4      0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Hours 30.8      3.4 3.4 0.6 0.6 0.6
% outage 0.35      0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01Republic LOLE 
GWh 4.0      0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
  Approximate capacity benefit compared to existing network 
Saving in MW of Capacity               
Northern Ireland MW -90      0 110 0 125 135
Republic of Ireland MW -290      0 0 75 75 75
Capacity Saving, value € M               
Northern Ireland € M -59 0 73 0 83 89 
Republic of Ireland € M -191 0 0 50 49 50 
                
All Island  € M -251 0 73 50 132 139 
                                                 
19 The transfer capacities used here are for illustrative purposes only. Further engineering studies would be needed to come up with more precise quantification of the nature of the 
existing constraints and how they would be changed by new infrastructure. 
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For the island as a whole, applying the LOLE security standard separately to the 
North and the South, the current interconnector, as characterised in this paper, saves 
around 380 MW of plant (simulation 1 in Table 4 compared to simulation 2).  This is 
almost equal to the combined North-South and South-North transfer capacity on the 
existing interconnector. The value of this saving in avoided capital investment is 
around €250 million for the island as a whole. 
The third simulation considers the case where the transmission is strengthened in the 
Louth region of the Republic so that the export capacity to the North from the 
Republic would be equal to the current assumed transfer capacity in the other 
direction of 300 MW. As shown in Table 4, this would allow a saving in generation 
capacity in the North relative to the current situation of 110MW of generation 
capacity, valued at around €73 million. Obviously there would be no impact on the 
generation capacity required in the Republic. 
The fourth simulation examines the effects of a second North-South interconnector 
without any strengthening in the transmission in the Louth region of the Republic.20 In 
this case, for the same level of security, the saving in generation capacity in the 
Republic would be 75MW, valued at €50 million. This is somewhat smaller than the 
saving which would arise from the strengthening of the transmission within the 
Republic, simulation 3.  
The fifth simulation looks at the effects of a second North-South interconnector 
combined with a strengthening of the transmission in the Republic. For the same level 
of security as under the current level of interconnection, this would allow a combined 
saving on the island of 200 MW of generation capacity, valued at €132 million. 
The sixth simulation looks at the effects of having unlimited (certain) transmission 
capacity between the North and the South. The results in Table 4 indicate that the 
additional benefits from this option would be small compared to simulation 5 - a 
second interconnector combined with the strengthening of the transmission capacity 
in the Louth area of the Republic.  
Security Standard 
So far we have considered the capacity required in each jurisdiction to meet a LOLE 
security standard of 8 hours a year, roughly equivalent to a forced outage rate of 
0.09%. On the basis of the current level of interconnection (using the stylised 
quantification of transfer capacities described earlier), Table 5 shows the LOLE and 
the related measure of unmet demand in GWh at different levels of generation 
capacity.21  (To simplify presentation this Table only shows results for a limited range 
of options on generation capacity.) It shows in bold those cases that would have 
approximated the security standard of 8 hours LOLE. For example, Table 5 shows 
that for the Republic of Ireland the LOLE standard of 8 hours could have been met 
last year with 100 MW less capacity. This would have resulted in an expected unmet 
demand of around 0.98 GWh. 
                                                 
20 This might also require some strengthening of the transmission in Northern Ireland. 
21 Appendix 5 gives details of the unmet demand under the range of simulations discussed in this paper. 
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For Northern Ireland the LOLE standard could have been met with a capacity saving 
of around 150 MW. This would have translated into an expected level of unmet 
demand of 0.73 GWh. Thus if the LOLE standard of 8 hours were applied separately 
to the two jurisdictions, with the current level of interconnection the expected level of 
unmet demand on the island of Ireland would have been the sum of the unmet demand 
for the two systems taken separately – 0.98 GWh plus 0.73 GWh making a total of 
1.71 GWH. 
Table 5 also shows that for the island of Ireland, treated as an integrated electricity 
system with infinite transfer capacity, the LOLE standard could have been met with a 
saving of 350 MW of generating capacity.22 At this level of capacity the 8 hours 
LOLE would have resulted in an expected level of unmet demand of 1.12 GWh. This 
level of unmet demand would have been much less than the level of unmet demand 
where the LOLE standard was applied to the two jurisdictions separately. This shows 
that the LOLE standard applied on an island-wide basis is a more rigorous standard 
than where it is applied to the North and the Republic separately; it would result in 
less disappointed customers on the island.  
Table 5: Effects on Security of Different Capacity Levels with Current Interconnector 
Generation Capacity  Republic of Ireland Northern Ireland Island of Ireland 
Interconnection Transfer Capacity 
 North–South and South–North Existing: 300/100 Existing: 300/100 Infinite 
     
Current LOLE 3.4 1.5 0.6 
 Probability % 0.04 0.02 0.01 
  GWh Unmet 0.4 0.11 0.07 
Less Generation or More Load    
-100 MW LOLE 8.1 4.6 1.3 
 Probability % 0.09 0.05 0.02 
  GWh Unmet 0.98 0.4 0.16 
-150 MW LOLE 12.3 7.9 2.0 
 Probability % 0.14 0.09 0.02 
 GWh Unmet 1.56 0.73 0.25 
-200 MW LOLE 19.5 14.3 2.9 
 Probability % 0.22 0.16 0.03 
  GWh Unmet 2.53 1.3 0.37 
-350 MW LOLE 78.8 59.6 8.8 
 Probability % 0.9 0.68 0.1 
  GWh Unmet 11.77 6.51 1.12 
Thus an LOLE standard is not invariant across jurisdictions and this raises the 
question as to what is the appropriate metric to use in considering the effects on the 
security of supply on the island of different strategies on interconnection. 
                                                 
22 With an integrated island system a separate application of the LOLE criterion to each jurisdiction 
would mean that if the island system were short of power all the cuts would be applied in the 
jurisdiction where the shortage occurred. An island wide application would involve a possible sharing 
of the shortage on some predetermined basis, independent of the jurisdiction in which it actually arose. 
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Sensitivity 
A number of additional tests were carried out to examine the sensitivity of the results 
to changes in generation capacity. These tests considered the effects on generation 
capacity needed to meet the specified LOLE standard from three options: more 
generating capacity in Northern Ireland; more wind generation; and the effects of a 
large nuclear station. 
In the first test we considered the case where there was an additional generating unit 
in Northern Ireland of 180 MW compared to the situation shown in Appendix 3 and 
where another unit was specified with a capacity of 180 MW rather than a capacity of 
117 MW. This would have resulted in an addition to the generating capacity for 
Northern Ireland of 243 MW. Obviously, for a given LOLE in a fully integrated 
island electricity system the inclusion of an additional 243 MW of generating capacity 
in Northern Ireland would allow a reduction in generating capacity in the Republic of 
a similar amount. However, it would change the distribution of the benefits from 
enhanced interconnection. 
Table 6: Savings in Generation Capacity, MW, with different interconnection options 
  Saving from Interconnection Options 
  Republic of Ireland Northern Ireland 
 Generation Capacity Benchmark 
Higher 
Northern Difference Benchmark 
Higher 
Northern Difference 
Interconnection Options             
No interconnection -290 -292 -2 -90 -81 9 
Existing Network and Interconnection 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reinforcement within Republic 0 -8 -8 110 80 -30 
Additional Interconnection and 
reinforcement in North 75 149 74 0 2 2 
Additional Interconnection and 
reinforcement within North and South  75 152 77 125 94 -31 
Infinite transfer capacity 75 157 82 135 95 -40 
In this simulation it is assumed that the LOLE is held constant at its 2003 level in the 
face of changes in interconnection. Table 6 shows the value of the different 
interconnection options under the two scenarios for generation capacity in Northern 
Ireland, in each case holding the LOLE constant. With the higher generation capacity 
in Northern Ireland the value of reinforcing the transmission in the Republic in the 
Louth area is substantially reduced. Also the value for Northern Ireland of a second 
interconnector to transfer power from the Republic to the North is reduced. This is 
because the increased generation capacity in Northern Ireland would have made the 
North more secure, reducing the value of the enhanced access to spare generation 
capacity in the Republic.  
Similarly, the additional generation capacity in Northern Ireland would increase the 
potential spare capacity available for export to the Republic. In turn, this means that 
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the value of any expansion in the transfer capacity from the North to the Republic 
would also be enhanced. Overall, with an increased imbalance in the distribution of 
generating capacity on the island (relative to demand), the benefits from enhanced 
interconnection will be greater than in the benchmark scenario. 
This scenario highlights the fact that the distribution of the benefits from enhanced 
interconnection will be very sensitive to the relative levels of surplus generating 
capacity in the North and in the Republic. These balances can change quite rapidly 
from year to year with growing demand and changes in the mix of generation capacity 
available. However, in the long run, as systems adjust to their optimal levels, the long-
term benefits for the island as a whole from enhanced interconnection should be 
reasonably predictable. 
A simulation was carried out to examine how the system would be affected by a 
major increase in wind capacity – in this case an increase in wind of 1000MW. This 
simulation suggested that, because of its intermittent nature, the additional wind 
would not add to system security. This replicates the results in Garrad Hassan (2002) 
and Eirgrid, 2004a. However, the results could be different if a more realistic 
assumption were used, allowing for a wider dispersion of wind availability across 
time. In the current case all of the wind capacity is assumed to be either available or 
unavailable for a day. In practise there will be some days when some of the wind is 
available and other parts of the wind system are not. 
The final simulation considered a situation where the output from the Poolbeg and 
Dublin Bay power plants was replaced by a single 1000 MW nuclear plant, leaving 
total generation capacity unchanged in the Republic.23 This assumption reflects the 
importance of economies of scale in nuclear plants – they come in much larger unit 
sizes than do other types of generating capacity. This would mean that instead of the 
1000 MW of generation capacity being spread over four independent units, subject to 
independent probabilities of forced outage, all the capacity would be concentrated in 
one unit. If that unit was forced to halt production it would immediately take 1000 
MW from the system. With four independent plants it would be exceptionally 
unlikely for all four of them to close simultaneously in the same way. Thus a single 
nuclear plant would seriously reduce the level of system security. 
The model simulations suggest that the maintenance of the 8 hours LOLE with such a 
nuclear plant on the system, and with current interconnection to Northern Ireland, 
would require an additional 330 MW of capacity. In a fully integrated island system it 
would still require an additional 270 MW of generation capacity to maintain system 
security unchanged. This need for additional generation capacity to back up the 
system would significantly increase the cost of any nuclear option. These calculations 
take no account of the greatly increased demand for spinning reserve that such a large 
plant would require to cover for unexpected events. What these simulations suggest is 
that even if there were no wider environmental or political concerns about building a 
nuclear plant, the economics of such an option would, in any event, be unattractive. 
The isolated nature and the small size of the Irish electricity system is likely to make 
this option unattractive on economic grounds alone for some time to come. 
                                                 
23 The output from the Marina plant was also reduced to ensure no change in generation capacity. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper develops a methodology to quantify some of the benefits from enhanced 
electricity interconnection on this island. The benefits considered are the increased 
reliability for electricity consumers on the island arising from enhanced 
interconnection. This model is applied to data for 2003 to provide a preliminary 
quantification of the benefits under a range of different options on interconnection. 
The data used in the model are provided for illustrative purposes only. To use the 
model to measure the effects of enhanced interconnection on system security in the 
future it will be necessary to calibrate the data correctly to the situation in the future 
year when such additional transfer capacity would be likely to become available. As 
currently configured, the model takes no account of the possible introduction of an 
East-West interconnector. Such a modification to the network could significantly 
affect these results. 
While the model shows the benefits separately for consumers in the North and the 
Republic, this breakdown will not be robust in the case of changes in the supply 
demand balance over the coming years. This is highlighted by the sensitivity tests 
described in Section 4. However, the results in terms of the aggregate benefits for 
consumers on the island can provide an appropriate benchmark against which to judge 
the advantages of different options on interconnection.  
The results indicate that electricity consumers on the island are receiving a very 
significant benefit from the operation of the, albeit constrained, existing 
interconnector between the North and the South. These benefits, in terms of reduced 
investment in generation capacity, are worth about €251 million. They arise as a result 
of the increased security provided by a more integrated island electricity system. This 
is likely to be substantially more than the replacement costs of the current 
interconnector. 
The model results also suggest that the construction of a second interconnector 
combined with reinforcement of the transmission system in the Louth region of the 
Republic would result in further potential savings in capacity worth around €132 
million. The strengthening of the transmission in the Louth region is likely to bring 
marginally greater benefits, in terms of increased security, than will the construction 
of a second interconnector. These savings of €132 million, on their own, would be 
likely to account for a significant part of the cost of a second interconnector and of the 
strengthening of the transmission in the Republic. On top of these savings there would 
be benefits in terms of a more efficient despatch of generating capacity on the island, 
enhanced competition, and further dynamic benefits as the system evolved in the 
future to accommodate the second interconnector. 
Finally, these results illustrate the fact that the LOLE standard produces different 
levels of expected unmet electricity demand depending on whether it is applied to 
both the electricity systems treated separately or to an island-wide system. 
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Appendix 1: Outage Probability Problem 
This appendix considers whether modelling forced outage on a day by day basis or on 
an hourly basis will have the same result when the model is run with a large enough 
number of simulations. 
NOTE: The hour in which the demand for electricity is greatest each day is regarded 
as the “peak hour”.  
1. There are 8760 hours in a year. If you pick one hour from all the hours in a 
year, what is the probability that it is a peak hour? 
Answer: If there is one peak hour each day, there are 365 peak hours in a year.  
365/8760 = 365/(365*24)  = 1/24 
2. If the 8760 hours in a year are split into 365 groups of 24 consecutive hours 
(e.g. days). Choosing only one group, what is the probability of still picking a peak 
hour? 
Answer: Since the groups contain 24 CONSECUTIVE hours, there will always be 
one peak hour in each group. Therefore, on a group level, there is a probability of one 
that the chosen group will contain a peak hour (365/365). However, within each group 
the 24 consecutive hours can be arranged consecutively in 24 different ways. This is a 
permutation of the derivative from 365 to 365 x 24. 
365/365…  365/(365*24)  = 1/24  
CONCLUSION:   
Whether the forced outage probabilities are applied on an hourly or daily basis is of 
no consequence, especially after consideration for the number of iterations, 10,000, in 
the monte carlo simulation. 
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Appendix 2: Annotated Code 
This code was written to run for the Gauss econometrics package. However, with the 
exception of the functions used, the code could easily be converted to run under a 
range of other languages. 
new;cls; 
ts=hsec; 
datestr (0) "           " timestr(0); 
format /rd 6,6; 
 
library pgraph;  
graphset; 
 
Iter=1000; // The number of monte carlo simulations 
Trans =SpreadsheetReadM("ModelIn.xls", "b71:d72", 1); //Read in details of interconnectors 
NSTrans1 = Trans[1,1]; //N-S transfer capacity on interconnector 1. 
SNTrans1 = (Trans[1,1]-200)*(Trans[1,1]>0); //S-N transfer capacity on interconnector 1. 
NSTrans2 = Trans[2,1]; //N-S transfer capacity on interconnector 2. 
SNTrans2 = Trans[2,1]; //S-N transfer capacity on interconnector 2. 
 
Capacity = SpreadsheetReadM("ModelIn.xls", "b2:b70", 1); // The capacity of each generating unit 
CapAll = Capacity[1:69]; 
 
Oper1 = SpreadsheetReadM("ModelIn.xls", "b2:br366", 2); 
Oper = Oper1';  // Oper1 transposed. this is one when the station is available and zero when it is undergoing 
//planned maintenance 
OperAll = Oper[1:69,1:365]; 
 
DayCons1 = SpreadsheetReadM("ModelIn.xls", "c2:ax70", 3); //This is one for the hours available in day, otherwise 0 
DayCons = DayCons1'; //Transpose it 
 
Fout = SpreadsheetReadM("ModelIn.xls", "i2:i70", 1);   //Forced Outage percentages// 
FoutAll = Fout[1:69]; 
// Foutall=Foutall.*0+1; This option is used if there is a zero probability of forced outage 
 
FD = SpreadsheetReadM("InterconnectP.xls", "e2:g17521", 3);//Read in demand on a 15 minute basis 
FD1 = FD[.,1]; FD2 = FD[.,2]; FD3 = FD[.,3]; // Split it into final demand for North, South and the Island 
FDRoI = sumc((reshape(fd1,24*365,2))')/2; //Turn the data into hourly data 
FDNI = sumc((reshape(fd2,24*365,2))')/2; //Turn the data into hourly data 
FDAll = sumc((reshape(fd3,24*365,2))')/2; //Turn the data into hourly data 
 
LolRoI = matinit(10000, 31, 0); //Initialise the matrix with the value of zero, dimensions, 1000, 30 
LolNI = matinit(10000, 31, 0); 
LolAll = matinit(10000, 31, 0); 
LostMWRoI = matinit(10000, 31, 0); 
LostMWNI = matinit(10000, 31, 0); 
LostMWAll = matinit(10000, 31, 0); 
 
// Statavail cumulates the capacity available over all iterations for each station for each hour 
// This is used to calculate average availability over all iterations 
StatAvail = matinit(8760,69,0); 
// Var is a matrix of additions or reductions in capacity to test sensitivity of LOLE to varying capacity 
Var=matinit(31, 1, 0); 
for i(1, 31, 1); 
Var[i] = i * 50 - 750; 
endfor; 
 
 
//This repeats the exercise for the specified number of iterations 
for i(1, Iter, 1); 
 
// Fileall  is the capacity available from each station for every hour of the day 
FileAll = matinit(69, 8760, 0); 
 
for j(1, 69, 1); 
    for k(1, 365, 1); 
// Capinop is the capacity available for the day for the relevant plant. For hydro stations they are only 
// available for some hours in the day. Rndyu is the random number generator 
    CapinOp = (rndu(1,1) < Foutall[j]) * capacity[j] * OperAll[j,k]; 
        for n(1, 24, 1); 
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        m = (k-1)*24+n; 
        fileAll[j,m] = CapinOp*DayCons[n,j]; 
        StatAvail[m,j] = StatAvail[m,j]+FileAll[j,m]; 
        endfor; 
    endfor; 
endfor; 
// Avilroi etc. give the total availability in each jurisdiction for each hour in the year 
    availroi=sumc(fileall[1:52,.])'; 
    availni=sumc(fileall[53:69,.])'; 
    availall=sumc(fileall)'; 
    for m(1,31,1); 
         
// Check and see whether interconnector(s) is forced out 
    Ic1Op = (rndu(1,1) < Trans[1,2]*(1-Trans[1,3])); 
    Ic2Op = (rndu(1,1) < Trans[2,2]*(1-Trans[2,3])); 
    NSTrans = Ic1Op*NSTrans1+Ic2Op*NSTrans2; 
    SNTrans = Ic1Op*SNTrans1+Ic2Op*SNTrans2; 
// capacity available for transfer - either a positive number or 0 
        SpareCNI= ((AvailNI-Var[M])'-FDNI).*(((AvailNI-Var[M])'-FDNI).>0); //Spare capacity in NI 
        SpareCRoI= ((AvailRoI-Var[M])'-FDRoI).*(((AvailRoI-Var[M])'-FDRoI).>0); //Spare capacity in RoI 
        SpareNI = (SpareCNI .> NSTrans)*NSTrans + (SpareCNI .<= NSTrans).* SpareCNI; //Spare in NI that can be transferred       
        SpareRoI = (SpareCRoI .> SNTrans)*SNTrans + (SpareCRoI .<= SNTrans).* SpareCRoI; //Spare in RoI that can be 
transferred            
        LolRoI[i,m]=sumc((FDRoI .> (availRoI-Var[m]+SpareNI')')*100/(365*24));  
        LolNI[i,m]=sumc((FDNI .> (availNI-Var[m]+SpareRoI')')*100/(365*24)); 
        LolAll[i,m]=sumc((FDAll .> (availAll-Var[m])')*100/(365*24));    
        LostMWRoI[i,m]=sumc((FDRoI .> (availRoI-Var[m]+SpareNI')').*(FDRoI - (availRoI-Var[m]+SpareNI')')); 
        LostMWNI[i,m]=sumc((FDNI .> (availNI-Var[m]+SpareRoI')').*(FDNI - (availNI-Var[m]+SpareRoI')')); 
        LostMWAll[i,m]=sumc((FDAll .> (availAll-Var[m])').*(FDAll - (availAll-Var[m])')); 
    endfor; 
endfor; 
// this shows the average loss of load in percentage for variations in capacity (by 50MW); base capacity is row 5. 
LoLRoIS=sumc((LoLRoI[1:Iter,1:31]))./Iter; 
LoLNIS=sumc((LoLNI[1:Iter,1:31]))./Iter; 
LoLAllS=sumc((LoLAll[1:Iter,1:31]))./Iter; 
 
LostMWRoIS=sumc((LostMWRoI[1:Iter,1:31]))./Iter; 
LostMWNIS=sumc((LostMWNI[1:Iter,1:31]))./Iter; 
LostMWAllS=sumc((LostMWAll[1:Iter,1:31]))./Iter; 
 
 
StatAvail1 = Statavail./Iter; 
 
matrixtowrite1=var ~ LolRoIS ~ LolNIS ~ LolAllS ~ LostMWRoIS ~ LostMWNIS ~ LostMWAllS; 
matrixtowrite2=iter ~ iter ~ iter ~ iter ~ iter ~ iter ~ iter; 
matrixtowrite = matrixtowrite2 | Matrixtowrite1;  
SpreadsheetWrite(Iter,"ModelOutput.xls","b2:b2",1);  
SpreadsheetWrite(NSTrans1,"ModelOutput.xls","b39:b39",1);  
SpreadsheetWrite(SNTrans1,"ModelOutput.xls","b40:b40",1);  
SpreadsheetWrite(NSTrans2,"ModelOutput.xls","c39:c39",1);  
SpreadsheetWrite(SNTrans2,"ModelOutput.xls","c40:c40",1);  
SpreadsheetWrite(MatrixtoWrite,"ModelOutput.xls","b6:h37",1);  
 
spreadsheetWrite(StatAvail,"ModelOutput.xls","b2:br8761",2); 
 
runtime = hsec-ts;print "Runtime = " runtime/100 " seconds"; 
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Appendix 3: Input Data 
This is the first sheet of the input matrix ModelIn.XLS 
 
Unit Capacity MW Planned Availability Probability of Forced Outage 
Moneypoint 285 0.909 0.072 
Moneypoint 285 0.909 0.072 
Moneypoint 285 0.909 0.072 
GreatIsland 57 0.873 0.092 
GreatIsland 57 0.873 0.092 
GreatIsland 112 0.873 0.092 
Tarbert 57 0.873 0.086 
Tarbert 57 0.873 0.086 
Tarbert 241 0.873 0.086 
Tarbert 241 0.873 0.086 
Aghada 258 0.873 0.039 
Aghada CT 90 0.873 0.026 
Aghada CT 90 0.873 0.026 
Aghada CT 90 0.873 0.026 
Marina 112 0.873 0.038 
NorthWall CC 109 0.873 0.080 
NorthWall CT 163 0.873 0.051 
PoolbegSteam 115 0.873 0.068 
PoolbegSteam 114 0.873 0.068 
PoolbegSteam 257 0.873 0.092 
PoolbegCCGT 230 0.873 0.020 
PoolbegCCGT 230 0.873 0.020 
Ardnacrusha 89 1.000 0.010 
Clady 4 1.000 0.010 
Erne 65 1.000 0.010 
Lee 27 1.000 0.010 
Liffey 34 1.000 0.010 
TurloughHill 73 1.000 0.020 
TurloughHill 73 1.000 0.020 
TurloughHill 73 1.000 0.020 
TurloughHill 73 1.000 0.020 
Bellacorick 37 0.873 0.150 
Edenderry 118 0.910 0.081 
West Offaly 0 0.910 0.081 
Lough Ree 0 0.910 0.081 
Lanesboro 85 0.873 0.150 
Shannonbridge 125 0.873 0.150 
Dublin Bay 196 0.910 0.080 
Dublin Bay 196 0.910 0.080 
Viridian 171.5 0.910 0.038 
Viridian 171.5 0.910 0.038 
Tynagh 0 0.910 0.050 
Tynagh 0 0.910 0.050 
Aughinish 0 0.910 0.050 
Aughinish 0 0.910 0.050 
Peak- Aghada 0 0.910 0.040 
Peak- Killala 0 0.910 0.040 
Peak - Rhode 51 0.910 0.040 
CHP 137 1.000 0.200 
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Wind 210 1.000 0.630 
Renewable - Hydro 16 1.000 0.400 
Renewable - LFG 19 1.000 0.150 
Ballylumford CC20 250 0.900 0.040 
Ballylumford CC20 250 0.900 0.040 
Ballylumford CC10 100 0.900 0.040 
Ballylumford CC10 117 0.900 0.031 
Ballylumford GT 58 0.900 0.010 
Ballylumford GT 58 0.900 0.010 
Kilroot ST 195 0.900 0.012 
Kilroot ST 195 0.900 0.012 
Kilroot GT 29 0.900 0.009 
Kilroot GT 29 0.900 0.009 
Coolkeragh ST 57 0.900 0.012 
Coolkeragh GT 57 0.900 0.012 
Coolkeragh CCGT 0 0.910 0.038 
Coolkeragh CCGT 0 0.910 0.038 
Northern CHP 100 1.000 0.200 
Northern Wind 20 1.000 0.630 
Interconnector 500 1.000 0.010 
N-S Interconnector 1 300 1.000 0.010 
N-S Interconnector 2 300 1.000 0.010 
 
09/11/2004 25 
Appendix 4: List of Spreadsheets used 
The data are available from the author. 
InterconnectP: Sheet 3 shows demand in the Republic and in the North for every 15 
minute period of 2003 
Modelin.XLS: Sheet Data lists the stations and the percentage planned availability 
and assumed probability of forced outage. Sheet YrCons specifies  the pattern of 
planned maintenance on a daily basis. Sheet DayConsH specifies which hours in the 
day stations are on or off. This only affects the hydro stations. 
ModelOutput.XLS: This gives the results shown above as Tables 2 and 3 in Sheet 
“Aggregate”. Sheet 2 shows the availability by station for each day of the year 
summed over all simulations. At the bottom it checks that the realised availability of 
each station equals the expected availability. Summaries of the results in terms of 
probabilities of forced outage, LOLE and unmet demand are given in subsequent 
sheets. 
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Appendix 5: Estimated Unmet Demand, GWh 
Republic of Ireland  Interconnection Capacity to RoI 
Expected Loss of Load, GWh  None Existing Existing Potential Potential Potential 
   Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Certain 
  0 300 300 600 600 Unlimited 
        
 300 0.32 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
more generation / less load 200 0.79 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 100 1.82 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01 
        
With Current Generation Capacity  4.01 0.40 0.38 0.07 0.07 0.07 
        
 -100 8.47 0.98 0.95 0.32 0.32 0.32 
 -200 17.06 2.53 2.49 1.40 1.40 1.42 
less generation / more load -300 32.77 6.85 6.79 5.60 5.60 5.61 
 -400 60.05 20.32 20.32 19.37 19.37 19.39 
 -500 104.87 57.52 57.34 56.77 56.77 56.79 
        
Northern Ireland  Interconnection Capacity to NI 
Expected Loss of Load, GWh  None Existing Existing Existing Potential Potential 
   Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Certain 
  0 100 300 100 400 Unlimited 
        
 300 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
more generation / less load 200 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 100 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
        
With Current Generation Capacity  0.37 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 
        
 -100 1.15 0.40 0.08 0.40 0.06 0.05 
less generation / more load -200 3.44 1.30 0.37 1.30 0.28 0.24 
 -300 8.77 3.94 1.39 3.94 1.14 1.05 
        
        
All Ireland  Interconnection Capacity 
Expected Loss of Load, GWh  None Existing Existing Potential Potential Potential 
   Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Certain 
        
 600 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
more generation / less load 400 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 200 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
        
With Current Generation Capacity  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
        
 -200 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.37 
less generation / more load -400 1.68 1.67 1.68 1.64 1.64 1.66 
 -600 6.72 6.69 6.70 6.63 6.63 6.67 
 -800 23.40 23.33 23.33 23.27 23.27 23.31 
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